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30 Abstract
This study examines the relationship between ownership structure and firm per-
formance using a sample of firms listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange in period 
2003-2009. The results obtained using a panel estimation with fixed effects show 
a significant negative relationship between the existence of a block holder owning 
more than 30% of the equity and the value of the firm’s Tobin’s Q. However, if 
there is a family-type second block holder, the effect disappears. Further, the study 
gives evidence of the negative impact of the fraction of equity owned by manage-
ment on labor efficiency confirming the quiet-life hypothesis from Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003). Finally, it is shown that foreign ownership is not significan-
tly better than domestic.
Keywords: ownership structure, ownership concentration, Tobin’s Q, return on 
equity, labor efficiency, block holder, management ownership, Croatia, Zagreb 
Stock Exchange
1 introduction
There has been much debate on corporate governance issues, but not many of 
them ended up with unambiguous answers. Different authors using different sam-
ples and methodologies often got dissimilar and even contradictory results. Disen-
tangling the relationship between the ownership concentration and firm perfor-
mance almost certainly took a longer time than authors expected when they first 
addressed this issue at the beginning of the twentieth century. Berle and Means 
(1932) were the first who seriously tried to explain the importance of ownership 
concentration. When managers hold a small fraction of the equity and sharehol-
ders are insufficiently dispersed to be able to enforce the value-maximization 
behavior of the management, corporate assets might be used in such a way as to 
benefit the manager instead of those who invested in the firm. A manager can, for 
example, use the weakness of shareholders to obtain private benefits such as sales 
growth, building a business empire, increasing employees’ welfare so as to avoid 
conflicts or he can simply decide to shirk without fear of being fired. However, as 
the fraction of the equity owned by the manager grows, the problem should be 
reduced as the interests of management and outside owners start to converge. 
This is only one of the potential theoretical explanations of the ownership-perfor-
mance puzzle which developed during the last several decades and which empha-
sizes the importance of the issue. The study of ownership concentration, its deter-
minants and the effect it has on different measures of corporate performance is 
even more important when the emerging markets are considered. In the post-com-
munist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, such as Croatia, ownership con-
centration remained the most widely spread governance mechanism. Another ar-
gument that makes these economies attractive for studying the ownership-concen-
tration relationship is that they all relatively recently went through the privatiza-
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31neity issue can be avoided or at least reduced. Third, the analysis of the effect of 
ownership concentration and the type of owner on performance provides informa-
tion that can be used to arrive at a closer definition of optimal ownership structure 
and optimal owner.
A number of studies have been performed using a sample of Central and Eastern 
European countries, but none of them went very deep in the analysis of the situa-
tion in Croatia. The aim of this paper is to identify the potential consequences of 
managerial ownership and large block holders on the performance of Croatian firms 
listed on the Zagreb Stock Exchange. The case of Croatia is not only interesting 
because it was not analyzed before, but also because of the specificity of the envi-
ronment this country was exposed to during the late eighties and early nineties. 
First, the early eighties were in Croatia characterized by worker self-management, 
economic liberalization and the appearance of small private firms. This means that 
the transition to capitalism was expected to be smoother than in other Eastern 
European countries as people knew how the market functions and what to expect. 
However, at the time the process of transition started, Croatia was hit by the war. 
It was because of this situation, it can be argued, that the process of privatization 
was often not transparent and much more politically influenced than it would have 
been in peacetime. Moreover, it postponed foreign investors entering in a big way 
until the second half of the nineties. This specific situation might yield results that 
are not in line with the studies done using the sample of other countries.
The study shows evidence of a negative relationship between the presence of a 
large shareholder and Tobin’s Q value of the company, attributed to the extraction 
of extra benefits by the large block holder at the cost of small shareholders. If 
there is a family-type second block holder present as well, this extraction is pre-
vented. Labor efficiency is affected by the fraction of equity held by the manager, 
and the relationship is negative and marginally significant. Also, there is no evi-
dence that foreign is better domestic than ownership, as it usually is in emerging 
economics.
Before deeper explanation of the empirical results, first chapter introduces the 
topic. Chapter two briefly discusses the previous literature. Third chapter defines 
the sample and data used in the empirical analysis of the ownership-performance 
relationship. Chapter four provides details about the methodology and results. 
Chapter five discusses potential endogeneity issues and it is followed by the chap-
ter six which provides brief summary of results and concluding remarks.
2 literature review
A look at previous studies might give a good first insight into the topic and provide 
a benchmark to which the results of this study can be compared. The relationship 
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32 nomists’ interests. Berle and Means (1932) argued that the dispersion of owner-
ship leads to the deterioration of a firm’s performance. Putting it more generally, 
they expected a negative correlation between the dispersion of shareholdings and 
corporate performance. When the manager and the owner are not the same person, 
interests do not always overlap, and conflict appears. When ownership is disper-
sed, the conflict is resolved in the manager’s favor. Small shareholders cannot 
organize themselves effectively and therefore rarely have any influence on the 
management. Moreover, the cost of monitoring the management is often too high 
for them, so small shareholders will usually not even try to do so. The board of 
directors might seem a logical solution to this problem, but in reality it is often 
inefficient. Having less information about the firm than the manager, a board often 
cannot prevent management from extracting additional rent at the expense of the 
shareholders. Moreover, the large income of directors provides little incentive for 
monitoring, having in mind the manager’s influence on election of the board 
members. 
This approach was for the first time seriously challenged by Demsetz (1983). He 
argued that ownership concentration depends on shareholders’ decisions and 
should be therefore treated as an endogenous variable. Demsetz also concludes 
that the profit rate, used as a measure of corporate performance, and ownership 
concentration should be therefore uncorrelated. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) analy-
zed five hundred US corporations. Their study examined two types of ownership 
concentration; the amount of shares owned by the five largest owners and the 
amount of shares owned by the manager. Estimates obtained showed no existence 
of a significant relationship between ownership concentration and accounting pro-
fit rates. 
More evidence for the existence of the endogeneity of managerial ownership can 
be found in the work of Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999). After controlling 
for observed firm characteristics and holding individual firm effects fixed, the 
authors found no evidence of a significant relationship between managerial ow-
nership and firm performance. Gugler and Weigand (2003) using a large sample of 
US firms concluded that managerial ownership is endogenous, but the largest sha-
reholders, however, affect the performance of the firm exogenously. The robu-
stness of the results was checked using a sample of German firms, which brought 
the authors to a conclusion similar to that already mentioned.
In the last two decades a significant number of papers were written on this topic, 
often yielding conflicting results. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) used Tobin’s 
Q as a measure of firm’s performance and obtained the evidence about the existence 
of a significant non-monotonic relationship between the two variables. McCon-
nell and Servaes (1990) using both Tobin’s Q and return on assets as measures of 
performance find a significant roof-shaped relation with ownership by managers 
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33investments, which in turn determines performance, which again determines the 
ownership structure. Accounting for this type of endogeneity, he finds that Tobin’s 
Q increases significantly until concentration reaches a certain limit and then starts 
to decrease. Using a sample of the largest European companies, Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) found positive effect of ownership concentration on corporate 
performance.
Damijan, Gregoric and Prasnikar (2004) tried to disentangle the relationship 
between ownership concentration and corporate performance in Slovenia. They 
find evidence for the absence of any significant influence of ownership control on 
a firm’s productivity. Such results are attributed to most well-performing firms 
lack of controlling owners and their different sources of growth. A non-monotonic 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance, and a significan-
tly worse performance of firms with block holders, is explained by the struggle 
among the block holders to gain ultimate control over the company.
There are very few studies using alternative approaches to address the issue. Fari-
nos et al. (2006) use the event study to explain the link between ownership con-
centration and performance on the Spanish market, and Wyatt (1990) tries to use 
the same method to explain the link between the structure of the board of directors 
and corporate performance. 
Considering the effect of owner’s origin on the performance, the situation is so-
mewhat clearer. Willmore (1986) concludes that the Brazilian firms with foreign 
owners significantly outperform domestically held firms. Chibber and Mujumdar 
(1999) confirmed this finding using the sample of Indian companies.
However, it seems that this effect is primarily characteristic of emerging econo-
mies. Globerman et al. (1994) compare foreign and domestically owned firms in 
Canada and find no differences in the performance. Foreign affiliates had signifi-
cantly higher value-added per worker and gave higher salaries, but these differen-
ces disappeared after controlling for more factors. Kim and Lyn (1990) report fo-
reign firms in the United States being less profitable than randomly selected do-
mestic firms. In the United Kingdom Driffield and Girma (2003) find no diffe- 
rence between the performances of foreign and domestically owned firms. Barbo-
sa and Louri (2003) conclude that ownership type is not related to the performan-
ce of firms in Greece and Portugal either.
3 data
This study analyzes official data on corporations listed on the Zagreb Stock 
Exchange (ZSE) in the period from 2003 until 2009. At the moment data for this 
study were collected (May 2011) the shares of 237 Croatian joint stock companies 
were listed. Out of those, 58 companies were listed after December 2003, and 
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34 financial, utility and other severely regulated institutions, in order to avoid the 
effect of these regulations on corporate performance. For 24 companies, some of 
the data, usually about ownership structure, was unavailable for the whole or most 
of the period observed. In addition to this, firms with extreme values of observed 
variables have not been included in the regressions. When these exclusions were 
made, the final sample included 119 corporations listed on the ZSE and a total of 
7461 observations.
3.1 ownership concentration
All the data for this research was collected manually from the annual financial 
reports which companies need to deliver according to the Stock Exchange regula-
tions. Table 1 shows some statistics on ownership concentration in the Croatian 
market for the first and the last year of the sample. Descriptive statistics are shown 
for the fraction of equity owned by the largest, three largest and five largest sha-
reholders on the ZSE.
table 1
Ownership concentration in Croatian firms (% of total equity)
Top1 Top3 Top5 Management
2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009 2003 2009
Mean 52.74 52.43 54.03 55.89 75.91 75.42 3.97 3.98
Median 54.13 54.13 56.04 59.31 85.91 85.59 0 0
Max. 98.62 98.62 100 100 100 100 100 100
Min. 7.40 6.29 15.33 19.39 19.40 22.79 0 0
Std. dev. 26.66 26.96 24.53 27.37 23.22 23.08 12.30 12.99
A quick observation is enough to conclude that there were not many changes con-
cerning the concentration of ownership. The ownership of the single largest sha-
reholder varies from 6.29% to 98.62% around the quite high mean which is just 
above the 50%. This fact is not very surprising bearing in mind the concentration 
in other emerging economies, and continental Europe in general (Claesens and 
Djankov, 1998; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2006; Gugler and Weigand, 2003). 
Having the approximately same value, the median tells that in half of the compa-
nies from the sample a single owner has absolute power over the corporation. 
However, the fractions of equity held by the following investors are also not insi-
gnificant. For inspecting the relationship between the largest shareholder and per-
formance, dummy variable B1_30 is created. It equals zero if the first block holder 
owns less than 30% of the equity and otherwise it equals one. On the other side, 
management ownership has a median equal to zero. Infrequent equity compensa-
tion and frequent changes of managers are probably the two main reasons for this 
1 One expects to see 833 observations in total. However, due to the incomplete reports for some of the observed 
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35situation. Managerial ownership will be measured by the variable Lmanager which 
is defined as a logistic transformation2 of the fraction of total equity owned by the 
management of the company. In order to capture possible non-linearity in the re-
lationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, I also create the 
variable Lmanager^2 which is the squared value of Lmanager. 
Managerial ownership is a continuous variable since one expects a manager to 
influence company performance even at zero level of ownership. Therefore, in 
order to capture the effect of managerial ownership, all values of ownership are 
considered relevant. Considering non-managerial block holders, the situation is 
different. Up to a certain threshold, small shareholders are not expected to influ-
ence the performance of the company. However, once they become strong enough, 
an effect might appear. Following this logic, B1_30 is defined as a dummy 
variable. Unfortunately, there is no specific method to identify the threshold at 
which the shareholder starts significantly influencing the performance of the com-
pany. Therefore, regressions were made using 20, 30 and 40% as a threshold for 
this dummy variable. The results were very similar, with the coefficients having 
the same sign, but slightly different values. I decided to use 30% as a threshold 
after introducing the second block holder B2_10. Such a combination of threshol-
ds allows enough observations in which both first and second large block holders 
exist. A larger sample would allow for more freedom in defining the thresholds.
If the principal-agent problem exists in the relationship between management and 
owners, the concentration values of the largest, three largest and five largest sha-
reholders are expected to be negatively correlated with managerial ownership, 
with the relationship getting stronger as we move from Top5 toward Top1. The 
stronger the owner, the less space a manager has to put his own interests before 
those of the shareholders. Also, entrenchment and accumulation of shares in order 
to strengthen his influence in the company becomes practically impossible without 
permission of the large owner. Votes of the single shareholder might also be enough 
to dismiss the manager, which, compared to the diffused ownership case, greatly 
simplifies the procedure. The data do confirm this hypothesis but correlations 
between the managerial ownership and three concentration measures are very low 
(-0.057; -0.062 and -0.076 for top one, three and five shareholders, respectively). 
3.2 corporate performance
In empirical studies focused on demystification of the ownership-performance re-
lationship, two performance indicators tend to be used more than others. Starting 
from Demsetz and Lehn (1985) the profit rate was used to evaluate firms’ perfor-
mance. In later studies, most of the authors found Tobin’s Q a more appropriate 
measure. While accounting profit rate is measured as the ratio of net income and 
2 Logistic measure of managerial ownership which converts the bounded numbers (0 to 100%) to an unbounded 
figure is widely used in the literature that deals with the ownership concentration-performance relationship 
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36 shareholders’ equity, Tobin’s Q is calculated as the market value of the company 
divided by the replacement value of the firm’s assets. 
Therefore, a low value of the coefficient (below 1) implies that the value of firm’s 
assets is greater than is recognized by the market, and the stock is undervalued. 
Analogously, a high Tobin’s Q implies that the stock is overvalued. There are two 
main differences in the mentioned approaches to performance measurements. 
From the time perspective, the profit rate can be described as a backward looking 
measure. It is a purely accounting way of measuring the success of the corporation 
and depends on the accomplishments of management in the previous period. On 
the other side, Tobin’s Q is a forward looking indicator and it is based on the inve-
stors’ expectations about the future profitability of the company. Therefore, it is 
highly affected by the stock market fluctuations. The second difference comes 
from the accounting standards. Profit rate is highly dependent on the accounting 
methods used and often does not give a reliable picture of the firm’s performance. 
The advantage of using Tobin’s Q is the avoidance of having to estimate true pro-
fit rates and balancing between different accounting rules under different jurisdic-
tions. However, this performance indicator is also not completely immune to 
accounting problems. For Tobin’s Q to be meaningful, one needs accurate measu-
res of both the market valuation of the company and the replacement costs of the 
firm’s assets. While the first is usually not the problem, if the firm’s stocks are 
regularly traded, the replacement costs are more complicated to calculate (Venka-
traman et al., 1986) and are therefore often proxied by the book value of total 
assets. Using the book value of assets makes the results once again vulnerable to 
accounting standards and firm policies. In this study I will use two widely-used 
measures of performance: return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. Moreover, I will 
try to capture the effect of ownership concentration on labor performance as an 
additional important measure. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) concluded that, 
when insulated from takeovers, managers are less hesitant to raise wages, aiming 
at avoiding confrontations with unions. Using labor efficiency as a dependent va-
riable allows a check on whether higher managerial ownership and entrenchment 
show some evidence in favor of the “quiet-life” hypothesis. This choice of depen-
dent variables is made in such a way as to include representatives of all financial, 
market and operative measures of performance.
Return on equity is defined as the ratio of net profit and shareholders’ equity. It 
reveals how much profit was made in comparison to total amount of shareholders’ 
equity found on the balance sheet. Labor efficiency is approximated by the ratio of 
labor cost and total revenues. These two indicators can be used over the whole 
sample. In the case of Tobin’s Q, it will be used on the subsample of more liquid 
firms. The Zagreb Stock Exchange distinguishes three degrees of liquidity, depen-
ding on the number of transactions in the previous twenty days. The least liquid 
shares will not be taken into account as the Tobin’s Q of such stocks does not 
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37depicts the behavior of the firm’s performance indicators over the observation 
period. The median is used instead of the mean to immunize the effect of the (both 
positive and negative) extreme values present in the sample. Labor efficiency does 
not suffer from this problem and the values of mean and median are very similar 
throughout the observed period.
table 2
Median values of performance indicators and labor efficiency
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
ROE 1.24 1.46 1.77 2.52 2.24 0.57 0.03
Tobin’s Q 0.25 0.36 0.44 0.64 0.82 0.31 0.29
Labor efficiency 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.23
Median ROE had a quite strong growth until 2006, and after a slow-down in 2007, 
it records a big fall in 2008 and a year later it practically reaches zero. Tobin’s Q 
behaves more stably, but it also records a significant drop in the year 2008. This 
drop is certainly caused by the huge drop in the stock prices caused by the world 
financial crisis. However, even before that, the stocks on ZSE were on average 
undervalued. On the other hand, labor efficiency is fairly stable over the whole 
period. The possible explanation is that with the fall in revenues, firms started 
firing workers and reducing labor costs, keeping the indicator almost unchanged. 
3.3 control variables
Additional variables need to be included in the regression in order to control for 
the possibility that factors other than ownership structure affect performance. Le-
verage is a natural logarithm of the amount of debt a firm uses to finance its assets. 
Management can decide to use high leverage in order to boost investments and 
increase shareholders’ wealth. However, if it fails to do so, interest expense and 
credit risk can decrease wealth. The Size of the company may affect performance 
since a large company can enjoy the benefits of economy of scale. I use natural 
logarithm of employment to proxy for firm size. I also tried alternative proxies for 
the size, such as revenues and total assets, but the number of employees proved to 
yield the most significant results. 
Following the work of Grosfeld (2006), I also include control for the intangible 
assets. Intan is defined as a share of intangibles in total assets. Since this category 
includes software, patents, brands, goodwill and other assets without physical su-
bstance, this variable is expected to proxy for high-tech firms with high added 
value in the process of production, and therefore better performance. However, it 
is also possible that this variable proxies for investments in R&D and patents 
more than for high-tech. To account for this I will check regressions for both the 
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38 Variable foreign_20 is a dummy which takes value one if a foreigner or a group of 
foreigners are owners of at least 20% of the firm’s equity and zero otherwise. Re-
gressions were done using 20, 30 and 40% thresholds for this dummy variable as 
well. Coefficients proved to be similar. I decided to use 20% as a threshold since 
it allows for the largest number of observations. This variable is generally ex-
pected to have a positive influence on the firms’ performance. However, as a result 
of the late entrance of foreign capital in Croatia, when the best companies had 
already been privatized by domestic investors, the effect can be different as well. 
As an alternative, I also use the variables foreign_1 and foreign_2 which equal 1 
if the first (second) largest owner is a foreigner and zero otherwise.
Old is a dummy which equals one if the firm was established before 1991 and has 
therefore, at least partially, gone through the process of privatization. In line with 
the previous literature, I differentiate four types of owners: family, company, state 
and financial/institutional owner. Types of ownership are dummy variables which 
equal one if the largest owner is a family/company/state/financial institution, and 
zero otherwise. As a reference value I take ownership by another company. Ander-
son (2003) investigated the founding-family ownership and came to the results 
that when family members are serving as CEOs, the firm performance is signifi-
cantly better than with the outside CEOs. A number of authors, including Grosfeld 
(2005), obtained negative coefficients for state ownership. Therefore, the family 
dummy is expected to be positively and state negatively correlated with the per-
formance measures.
Finally, in all of the panel regressions I will use year dummies. Year dummies are 
included in order to control for the macroeconomic environment which affects all 
the observed firms. Controlling for macroeconomic shocks is crucial for an eco-
nomy exposed to large changes. Moreover, the sample extends to the years in 
which we expect to observe the negative consequences of the world financial cri-
sis on the performance of companies listed on the Croatian stock exchange. 
I also include firm fixed effects in panel data. Holding for the effects of industry is 
not convenient as Zagreb Stock Exchange differentiates among 38 different indu-
stries where some categories include no, one or two firms. 
4 empirical methodology
In the following estimations return on equity, Tobin’s Q and labor efficiency are 
regressed on ownership variables and the control variables. First, the managerial 
ownership is put in focus, and then the ownership of the largest shareholder. The 
largest owner expectation is motivated by the great concentration of ownership on 
the Croatian stock exchange.
Panel data analysis has been used here. By their construction, panel data allow us 
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39relevant when one expects that the means of the dependent variable, in this case 
ROE, Tobin’s Q and labor efficiency, will be different for each firm and period, 
but with constant variance of the errors (Asteriou, 2006). Fixing the periods is 
important in order to capture the macroeconomic shocks present, especially in the 
last three years of the sample. Fixed cross-sections allow for capturing firm-speci-
fic effects. This gains even more in importance when one has in mind that Zagreb 
Stock Exchange is relatively small, and controlling for industry dummies would 
not be very useful.
4.1 managerial ownership
Two effects are usually discussed when speaking about managerial ownership: 
incentive and the entrenchment effect. As long as management is not powerful 
enough, the incentive effect prevails. In order to preserve their position, managers 
must persuade owners, represented by the board of directors, that firms are run in 
the best possible way. Therefore, firms’ performance is expected to improve with 
higher managerial ownership up to the point at which the manager becomes en-
trenched and puts own private before the benefits of outside investors. Beyond 
this point, the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate perfor-
mance is expected to be negative. This theoretical inverse U-shaped curve was 
empirically confirmed by a number of authors. However, most of the studies were 
done using US data, where the ownership is more dispersed than in the rest of the 
world, as shown by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1988). 
Using the panel data for the period 2003-2009 with ROE as a dependent variable 
I obtain results summarized in table 3. Regression function (1) includes the mana-
ger as the only variable explaining the variations in firms’ return on equity. Re-
gression function (2) checks for the possible non-linearity in the relationship 
between the two variables, but finds none. Regression function (3) includes some 
variables which control for other things that might influence performance, and the 
fourth regression tries to capture the effect that the type of the ownership over the 
firm might have on ROE. In the last column the regression is defined as in the 
previous one, except for the fact that the squared value of managerial ownership 
is excluded once again. 
The effect of managerial ownership is negative only in the simplest regressions, 
with the standard error being twice as large as the size of the estimated coefficient. 
Afterwards, in all the following regressions, the coefficient is positive, but re-
mains insignificant. Panel data show that there is a significant non-linear relation-
ship between the size of the firm and its return on equity. First, as the firm grows, 
its return on equity increases and after a certain point starts decreasing. Leverage 
has a strong negative effect which is similar in size with the strong positive effect 
of the fraction of intangibles. It is interesting that the panel estimation resulted in 
the negative coefficient for the foreign_20. This unexpected sign can be partially 
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40 table 3
Fixed effects estimation of the effect of managerial ownership on ROE












































































R-squared (%) -23 -23 -30 -30 -30
N -746 -746 -634 -634 -634
***, **, and * are used to denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. N stands for 
the number of observations. Standard errors in parenthesis.
The regression with Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance yields somewhat si-
milar results (table 4). Although the coefficient on Lmanager is always negative, 
compared with the situation with ROE where it was mostly positive, it is still in-
significant on any acceptable level of significance. In the firms listed on the ZSE, 
managerial ownership seems not the affect the value of Tobin’s Q. Similarly to the 
estimate obtained for ROE, leverage has a negative effect on performance. How-
ever, two other control variables might be of more interest. Old firms seem to be 
more valued by the market.
Before arguing against this result, one should recall that old firms listed on the 
stock exchange are the best and the strongest firms, which started business in a 
market much larger than that in Croatia today. It is highly probable that they kept 
some of business connections and already have a developed brand in neighboring 
countries allowing them to expand more easily. Furthermore, they were strong 
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41type of a selection bias is most certainly the main reason why the coefficient for 
old firms tends to be positive and significant.
table 4
Fixed effects estimation of the effect of managerial ownership on Tobin’s Q












































































R-squared (%) -69 -69 -71 -71 -71
N -446 -446 -403 -403 -403
***, **, and * are used to denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. N stands for 
the number of observations. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Firms with significant foreign ownership, on the other hand, have once again a 
negative coefficient, although significant only in the regression (3). This result can 
be explained by the process of privatization. Most of the privatization process in 
Croatia was conducted during the conflict and post-conflict period when interna-
tional companies were not attracted to Croatia. Other Eastern European econo-
mies were in the processes of mass privatization and the choice for investing was 
wider than ever. After 1999, when foreign investments became abundant in Croa-
tia, the best firms already found their owners among domestic investors. Firms 
that have a financial institution as a largest owner have significantly larger value 
of Tobin’s Q than others. The effect of the fraction of intangibles in the total assets 
is ambiguous in this case, meaning that although superior from the point of view 
of ROE, firms with a higher share of intangibles do not have a significantly higher 
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42 While cross-sectional analysis discovered negative relationship between the ma-
nagerial ownership and labor efficiency (not reported in this paper), panel data 
show that these results were probably affected by the unobserved heterogeneity 
(table 5). Fixed effects estimator for managerial ownership is significant and ne-
gative at the 10% significance level only after inclusion of control variables. This 
result is a soft confirmation of the “quiet life” hypothesis stated by Bertrand 
(2003). As they become more entrenched, managers prefer to increase salaries 
than to fight the unions. Efficiency suffers, but since there is no danger from takeo-
vers, managers fearlessly enjoy the quiet life. 
table 5
Fixed effects estimation of the effect of managerial ownership on labor efficiency












































































R-squared (%) -76 -76 -78 -79 -79
N -744 -744 -633 -633 -633
***, **, and * are used to denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. N stands for 
the number of observations. Standard errors in parenthesis.
The size coefficient which was always significant in the cross-sectional analysis 
becomes insignificant and there is no evidence of non-linearity. Intangibles are 
positively related with the efficiency measure, but the coefficient is marginally 
significant only in the regression (5). Old firms are more efficient than firms foun-
ded after 1991. Again, one should recall the previously used argument that the 
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43which were strong enough to continue operating after the war and usually already 
had contacts and business in other countries, primarily the countries of ex-Yugo-
slavia. Firms where the state is the largest shareholder are expectedly less and fa-
mily firms more efficient than firms owned by another company. State firms often 
belong to the traditional and labor intensive industries. Moreover, government is 
often very reluctant to cut the number of employees, even though it is often much 
higher optimally needed, as political are often privileged over economic objecti-
ves. On the other hand, a family as an owner cares in the first place about the 
profitability of its business as it is almost certainly the main source of its income. 
For this reason, families try to achieve the maximum possible labor efficiency and 
not employ more labor or pay salaries higher than they consider optimal. 
4.2 largest shareholder
One of the most widely accepted views among authors, including Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), McConnel and Servaes (1990), Zingales (1996), and Claessens 
and Djankov (1998), is that higher concentration of ownership improves the per-
formance of the firms due to the stronger incentive to monitor the actions of ma-
nagement. For small shareholders this incentive is very low or even non-existing 
since the cost of monitoring is often higher than the potential benefits from it. On 
the other side, large block holders can offset the cost of the monitoring by the rise 
of their equity value. Moreover, in the case of non-monitoring, managers could 
put their private benefits in front of the shareholders’ and in that way cause them 
losses that outweigh the cost of monitoring. 
On the other side there are authors who argue that this relationship is dubious as 
the expected gains from active monitoring vary across countries and firms (Dem-
setz and Lehn, 1985). Also, in countries with not efficient protection for small 
shareholders, the existence of large block owners can decrease liquidity, make the 
firm less attractive to other investors and decrease its market capitalization cau-
sing a negative relationship of ownership concentration and Tobin’s Q as a mea-
sure of performance. 
Regressions using fixed period and cross-section effects show no significant rela-
tionship between the existence of a large block holder and return on equity (table 
6). In the case when the financial institution is the block holder, the coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 5% level of significance. The presence of other 
types of owner neither increases nor decreases firms’ return on equity. Both in 
regression functions (2) and (3) the leverage has a large negative effect, while the 
effect of intangibles is significantly positive only in the regression function (3), 
when the type of the owner is controlled for. Foreign ownership is once again 
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44 table 6
















































R-squared (%) -23 -29 -30
N -746 -634 -634
***, **, and * are used to denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. N stands for 
the number of observations. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Panel regression identifies the significant negative relationship between the varia-
bles B1_30 and the value of Tobin’s Q (table 7). This result is most likely influen-
ced by the behavior of other firms being the owners of the companies listed on the 
Zagreb Stock Exchange. A financial institution as owner, on the other hand, affects 
performance positively. There are two potential explanations for the negative in-
fluence of a block holder on the value of Tobin’s Q. First, as already mentioned, it 
reduces the liquidity of the firm’s shares on the stock market.
Secondly, the large shareholder might use its influence to extract benefits from the 
firm through less than optimal dividend payments, failure to reinvest, transferring 
profitable parts of the business to other firms in its ownership and similar devices. 
Once again more leveraged firms perform significantly worse than those which 
finance their assets through equity and firms founded before 1991 are valued more 
by outside investors. If the block holder is a foreigner, the effect is negative and 
significant in regression function (2), but after controls for the type of owner are 
introduced, the effect disappears.
The presence of a large owner does not affect the efficiency of labor (table 8). It 
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45it is owned by another company. However, having a family as a largest block hol-
der increases the efficiency for the reasons previously discussed, and ownership 
by the state affects the efficiency negatively. Similarly to the estimates obtained 
when regressing managerial ownership on labor efficiency using panel data, com-
pany size is not so effective in explaining the variations in efficiency. Leverage 
has a negative effect, but visibly smaller than in the case of Tobin’s Q and return 
on equity. The conclusion that the firms established prior to 1991 are more labor 
efficient is confirmed once again at the 10% level of significance. Foreign owners 
do not perform significantly better or worse than domestic owners.
table 7 
Fixed effects estimation of the 
effect of existance of block  
holder on Tobin’s Q
table 8 
Fixed effects estimation of the 
effect of existance of block  
holder on LE



















































































R-squared (%) -69 -71 -72 -75 -78 -79
N -446 -403 -403 -744 -633 -633
***, **, and * are used to denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. N stands for 
the number of observations. Standard errors in parenthesis.
4.3 second block holder
The existence of a second large shareholder in the firm can also be important for 
the firm’s performance. In the sample of firms from Zagreb Stock Exchange con-
sidered here, the mean value of the fraction of equity held by the second owner is 
more than 12%, making it potentially important for an explanation of firms’ per-
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46 bin’s Q is mainly due to the illiquidity issue, the effect of the second large sha-
reholder should also be expected to be negative. The conclusion comes from the 
fact that in this case free-float is even smaller and liquidity is likely to be even less. 
However, if the negative coefficient is the result of the largest owner extracting 
private benefits from the firm, results might be different. If there is a chance for 
cooperation between the two agents, the private benefits will have to be shared 
among the two and the effect is likely to be small and negative or even insignifi-
cant. However, if there is no cooperation, the second large block holder has a large 
incentive to monitor the first one and prevent some of the private benefits being 
extracted. In order to check for the effect of the existence of the second large block 
holder in the company I define variable b2, the second block holder, as a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the second owner owns more than 10% of equity and 
zero otherwise. The results of the regression are shown in table 9.
table 9 
Fixed effects estimation of the effect of existance of second block holder on Tobin’s Q
































































R-squared (%) -69 -70 -71 -72
N -446 -446 -403 -403
***, **, and * are used to denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. N stands for 
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47Regression function (1) includes only two dummy variables which control for the 
presence of the first and second block holder, having more than 30% and 10% of 
equity, respectively. The effect of the first block holder remains significantly ne-
gative; while the coefficient for the second block holder has no effect on the value 
of Tobin’s Q. Regression function (2) includes an interaction term which also 
fails to capture any significant effect. In the third regression, after controlling for 
other variables, the coefficient for the second block holder becomes positive, but 
still very insignificant. The regression in the fourth column also includes the inte-
ractions between the dummy variables for the presence of block holders and the 
identity of the second block holder. The reasoning for including the second block 
holder type in the interaction terms is that different types of owners have different 
strengths of incentive to undertake monitoring. A family is expected to have the 
strongest incentive, while the state is expected to be the most passive owner. Re-
gression function (4) partially confirms the expectations. If the second block hol-
der is a family, the effect is significantly positive and by its size more than offsets 
the negative effect of the first block holder. The state and financial institutions as 
the second block holders do not affect the value of Tobin’s Q. 
According to Gugler and Weigand (2003), large owners affect the performance 
exogenously. However, management influence can suffer from the endogeneity 
which is discussed in the following chapter.
5 endogeneity issue
A large part of the empirical evidence on the relationship between the ownership 
structure and performance assumes ownership is exogenous. However, even since 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) there is an idea that ownership is 
endogenously determined in the process of balancing advantages and disadvanta-
ges of different ownership structures. As shown by Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001), endogeneity causes serious problems in estimating the relationship 
between the two variables and after controlling for the simultaneity between the 
two, the effect disappeared. 
In dealing with this issue, I will consider the study of Gugler and Weigand (2003). 
They used panel data from Germany and the United States and concluded that 
managerial ownership is econometrically endogenous3. However, large sharehol-
ders affect the performance of the firms exogenously. Not only is it one of the 
most cited articles on this topic, but it is also interesting as it does not use only US 
data as most authors do. According to its legal framework, Croatia is much more 
similar to Germany than to the US. Moreover, the German economy is also cha-
racterized by the widespread existence of large shareholders. Furthermore, a poli-
tically influenced privatization process in the beginning and mass privatization 
after are also arguments for the exogeneity of the largest shareholder.
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48 For all the stated reasons, the following part of this chapter will try to examine 
whether the previously found effect of managerial ownership on firm performance 
in Croatia is affected by endogeneity. In order to deal with the endogeneity con-
cerns, the two stage estimator (2SLS) is used. In order for this instrumental varia-
ble estimation to be reliable, one needs to find an instrument that is correlated with 
the potentially endogenous variable and genuinely exogenous to the model. In the 
case of ownership concentration, it is unusually difficult to come out with such a 
variable. Himmelberg (1999) argued that stock price volatility is not a perfect but 
still an acceptable instrument for ownership structure. The argument is that when 
the environment is more volatile the cost of monitoring the management is higher, 
but the potential benefits from doing it are higher as well. On the other hand, when 
the firm environment is relatively stable, shareholders have less difficulty, but also 
less incentive to monitor the managers. As a result, it is expected that the riskier 
firms (firm with higher stock price volatility) will have on average higher concen-
tration of ownership. I have calculated standard deviation and variance using the 
daily data on stock prices reported by the Zagreb Stock Exchange. However, this 
instrument is not correlated with the potentially endogenous managerial owner-
ship and is therefore excluded as a possible instrumental variable. 
table 10 
IV estimation of the effect of managerial ownership on return on equity and labor 
efficiency
RHS: Labor  
efficiency




























































R-squared (%) 79 30 71
N 633 634 403
***, **, and * are used to denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. N stands for 
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49Another possibility is to use lagged explanatory variables as instruments for ma-
nagerial ownership, as suggested and done by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991). 
Results of the 2SLS regressions of managerial ownership on labor earnings and 
return on equity, instrumented by the lagged right hand side variables, are shown 
in table 10. Before discussing the result in more detail, I would like to emphasize 
one serious weakness of this estimation. If the main sources of the endogeneity are 
the firm characteristics for which the model does not control for, and further if 
they are not constant over time, then the lagged variables will still suffer from the 
endogeneity issue. However, having in mind the given data set and for want of a 
better instrument, this is almost certainly the best one can do. The result of the 
2SLS confirms the panel estimations that there is no significant relationship 
between managerial ownership with ROE or Tobin’s Q. However, the effect on 
labor efficiency survives the endogeneity check and remains negative and signifi-
cant at the 10% level. Moreover, the effect is even larger than in previous estima-
tions. The squared managerial ownership is significant only at the 15% level of 
significance meaning that there is no non-linearity between the two variables. 
6 conclusion
The potential relationship between ownership structure and corporate performan-
ce has been one of the most important and most widely discussed questions in 
corporate governance, but explanations of this relationship have been often very 
different and indeed contradictory. This last part of the study summarizes the main 
results.
The presence of a large block holder decreases the value of Tobin’s Q, while ha-
ving no significant effects on ROE and labor efficiency. The explanation for this 
is that a powerful owner, in an environment where the small shareholders are not 
carefully protected by the authorities, will try to extract additional benefits from 
the firm at their expense of the small shareholders. This scares away small inve-
stors, decreasing the market capitalization of the firm and therefore the firm’s 
Tobin’s Q. Since the situation might be different if there is a second relatively 
large block holder that can monitor the first block holder and prevent some of the 
benefits being extracted, I separately examine this case. 
The results of the regression show that if there is a second block holder in the 
company, it does not significantly influence the value of Tobin’s Q, unless it is a 
family or an individual. 
Families and individuals have large incentives to monitor and try to prevent the 
largest shareholder putting his interests before the interests of other shareholders 
since for them it is usually the main source of income (opposed to state owner-
ship). Therefore, the regressions show a large, positive and statistically significant 
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50 By accepting the finding of Gugler and Weigand (2003) that large owners affect 
performance exogenously while managerial ownership is endogenous, in estima-
ting the effect of managerial ownership on performance, I first used cross-sectio-
nal and panel analysis, and then checked for endogeneity problems by using lag-
ged control variables as instrumental variables. The regressions show a marginally 
significant negative effect of managerial ownership on labor efficiency. This result 
represents a weak confirmation of the “quiet-life hypothesis” stated by Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003). Once managers are entrenched enough, they prefer to 
avoid conflicts with labor unions, which they do by raising salaries and not cutting 
staff. As a result, labor efficiency decreases. The other two observed measures of 
performance proved to be unaffected by the fraction of equity held by manager.
Although different authors often confirmed the positive effect of foreign owner-
ship on a firm’s performance, the sample from Croatia does not support this view. 
In all the estimations conducted in this study, foreign ownership has either a nega-
tive or an insignificant effect on performance. This might be due to the relatively 
late entry of foreign capital in Croatia due to the war to which the country was 
exposed until 1995. Foreign investment became significantly higher only after 
1998, and by that time most of the best firms had already been privatized by do-
mestic investors.
It might be interesting to re-check the results using a longer data set that would 
allow for examination of the relationships between the first and second block hol-
der while controlling for the type of both of them. However, only these data were 
available at the time this study was written, while the sample is too small and has 
too few changes in ownership to allow for such extensive controls, which must be 
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